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J URISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
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or v-:-*- Appellants' quaranty was as ana toi "cosine c^sts" 
on a larqer loan to a third part^ out \ .h.ieh Appellants vere :.o 
1 • • n.- - 2 
S288,i * . ;' A 1 hypothecated by thiid parties, and : i> «n - •-: 
secured* ^ m * - -~*^ n' ti atpri to ^ ^reol^se n thf spcin t^, n^--1 fho 
guarai ltor mo-. • : . • - • , • ., 
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1
 Whether there is a dutv of good taith and fair dealing 
between a lend*- r ^nd H guarantor • - transaction. 
"t 7he - i fa 3 1 i i:i : e be • = st abl :i sh 
a proper escrow may recover from, the guarantor, or has "unclean 
hands" bar r \ r • recovery. 
3 KiiL '^A ; , lender who changes the primary o:.. . : gat i J. e 
borrower thereby re leases the guarantor. 
The McDonalds1 status may have been that of a "surety" or "indemnitor," 
but "guarantor" seems more accurate because the McDonalds' obligations arise out 
of a separate instrument and were agreed to be secondary. For convenience, the 
term "guarantor" is used herein. The incidents of the obligation, and its re-
lease, are functionally the same however it is characterized. 
4. Whether there is a "reciprocal bargain" supporting an 
agreement to furnish "security" for the payment of closing costs 
on a loan if the funds are paid to third persons rather than for 
closing of the loan, 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 70A-1-203, controls the "good faith and fair dealing" 
question: 
Every contract or duty within this act im-
poses an obligation of good faith in its 
performance or enforcement. 
UCC § 3-606, UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-606, controls whether an 
extension of the time for performance or impairment of collateral 
effects a release of the guarantor: 
Impairment of recourse or of collateral. 
(1) The holder discharges any party to the 
instrument to the extent that without such 
party's consent the holder 
(a) without express reservation of 
rights . . . agrees to suspend the 
right to enforce against such person 
the instrument or collateral . . . or 
(b) unjustifiably impairs any col-
lateral for the instrument given by 
or on behalf of the party or any person 
against whom he has a right of recourse. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from summary judgment entered against the 
Defendants, foreclosing on their real property pledged, as security 
for closing costs advanced to obtain a loan, and denying the 
Defendants1 motion to dismiss on the theory that failure of 
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Plaintiffs to secure the loan amounted to a failure of considera-
tion and disregard of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
A. Course of Proceedings. 
Following the filing of Plaintiffs1 Complaint, Plaintiffs 
moved for summary judgment and the Defendants moved to dismiss and 
for summary judgment. The competing motions were based upon depo-
sition testimony jointly submitted by the parties which forms 
uncontroverted facts herein. 
B. Disposition in the Court Below. 
The trial court, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District 
Judge, presiding, entered summary judgment for the Plaintiffs and 
a judgment, decree of foreclosure and order of sale in the amount 
of $505,261.12, inclusive of attorneys1 fees and interest at twenty 
percent (20%) per annum. Summary judgment was based upon a Memo-
randum Opinion, which constitutes the only findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, concluding, inter alia, that it was "uncontro-
verted" that the $288,000.00 was "consideration" because "Defendant 
understood that the proceeds of the loan which its trust deed and 
note secured would be paid to another person to be used as closing 
costs on the Currier loan." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in the matter at bar are bizarre, involving inter-
national intrigues over purported loan transactions in the billions 
of dollars, the promise of millions of dollars in "payoffs" and 
novices in high finance failing to apply ordinary commercial prac-
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tices, moving the trial judge to observe that they read "much like 
an epic poem of an odyssey with the end of a rainbow as its desti-
nation." (Mem. Op. 3.) The central characters in the "odyssey" 
are sometimes comic in their ineptitude, reminiscent of "rug mer-
chants" operating in league with field grade officers out of the 
White House basement. Nevertheless, as the trial judge also 
observed, "the details of this saga are unimportant" and its 
essentials really quite simple. 
The facts are uncontroverted, and consist of deposition testi-
mony submitted by joint agreement of the parties. Pertinent por-
tions of that testimony are cited hereafter in the abbreviated 
1/ 
s t y l e se t out a t the margin. 
A. Essen t i a l Fac t s . 
Simply s t a t e d , the c e n t r a l f ac t s involve an a l leged loan of 
b i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s to one Linda Curr ier ("Currier") from an un-
named European or Arabian source — the "pot of gold" al luded to 
by Judge Murphy. C u r r i e r ' s "jumbo" loan was to have funded 
smaller commercial loans , including one in the amount of $3 mi l l ion 
to the Defendant-Appellant McDonald Brothers , Inc . ("McDonalds"), 
Nei l P. Chr i s t enson d e p o s i t i o n da ted May 8, 1985, c i t e d as "N. Chr i s t enson 
depo . " 
Robert Chr i s t enson d e p o s i t i o n da ted May 8, 1985, c i t e d as "R. Chr i s t enson 
depo ." 
David G a r r e t t d e p o s i t i o n da ted May 8, 1985, c i t e d as " G a r r e t t depo . " 
Howard McDonald d e p o s i t i o n da ted May 13, 1985, c i t e d as "H. McDonald depo . " 
Stevenson McDonald d e p o s i t i o n da ted May 13, 1985, c i t e d as "S . McDonald 
depo . " 
Larry Sorenson d e p o s i t i o n da ted November 14, 1983, c i t e d a s "Sorenson 
depo. No. 1 . " 
Larry Sorenson d e p o s i t i o n da ted May 7, 1985, c i t e d as "Sorenson depo. 
No. 2 . " 
Dean Z a b r i s k i e d e p o s i t i o n da ted May 7, 1985, c i t e d as " Z a b r i s k i e depo. 
No. 2 . " 
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but was said to be contingent upon finding a source for $288,000.00 
needed for "closing costs." 
Larry Sorenson ("Sorenson") approached the Plaintiff-Appellees 
Neil P. Christenson, et al. ("Christenson") and proposed that they 
loan the $288,000.00. Christenson was to be secured by a lien on 
Currier's real property in California and be paid a $1 million 
"bonus" together with interest on the $288,000.00. Christenson 
agreed. Subsequent to Christenson1s agreement, and because apprais-
als on the Currier property were not then available, Christenson 
requested that "additional security" be furnished. 
3/ 
Sorenson then approached the McDonalds with the proposal 
that if they would pledge their real property as the additional 
security for a ten-day period, to be resorted to only if Currier's 
property proved insufficient, they would receive a $3 million loan 
to fund their condominium project out of Currier's jumbo loan. 
McDonalds did so by giving a note and trust deed to their property, 
copies of which are attached as Appendix "A" and "B", respectively. 
It is an uncontroverted fact, testified to by Christenson and 
corroborated by the McDonalds and Sorenson, that the $288,000.00 
and the security furnished by the McDonalds were agreed to be as 
and for closing costs on the Currier loan. The trial judge spe-
cifically found it. to b£ a fact that the loan which the McDonalds' 
trust deed secured was "to be used as closing costs for the Currier 
loan" (Mem. Op., 4) and that it "is undisputed that [the $288,000.00 
was] for use as closing costs on the Currier loan." (Mem. Op. 7.) 
Sorenson in fact started on his "odyssey" in search for a loan for the 
McDonalds. See p. 6, infra. 
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Christenson then dispatched its agent, Dave Garrett ("Garrett"), 
to the offices of one Sasha Teplitz ("Teplitz") in Camden, New 
Jersey to establish an escrow and from there to the Bahamas for the 
closing. No escrow was established, however, and the $288,000.00 
was merely wired to the account of "Forex Monetary, Ltd." and never 
applied to any closing. Teplitz, Currier and Garrett then went to 
the Bahamas where the closing was to have been held, but for unex-
plained reasons it never occurred. The $288,000.00 was never 
recovered and the McDonalds never received their $3 million loan. 
Christenson foreclosed on Currier's property, which was in-
sufficient to secure the $288,000.00 and accumulated interest, and 
then brought this action to foreclose against the note and trust 
deed furnished by the McDonalds as additional collateral. 
B. Details of the Transaction. 
The "odyssey," to advert again to Judge Murphy's characteriz-
ation, with a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow as its end, 
involves much more. 
1. The Role of Larry Sorenson. It was an agreed fact that 
all of the parties were introduced to Currier and her alleged loan 
in the billions of dollars through the activities of Sorenson, who 
acted in the capacity of a loan broker (though in fact he had no 
qualifications to do so). 
In 1981, the McDonalds contacted Sorenson and requested that 
he assist them in finding a source for a $3 million loan to fund 
1/ 
Silverwood Estates. In the course of his efforts, Sorenson 
4 
H. McDonald depo. pp. 19-20, 22; S. McDonald depo. pp. 10-12, 19, 
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learned that there was a woman in California by the name of Linda 
Currier who claimed to have billions of dollars of "Arabian" or 
"European" funds available to her for commercial loans, but needed 
$288,000.00 for "closing costs". Sorenson and his lawyer en-
gaged in a telephone conversation with Currier and Teplitz, in 
which Teplitz explained that the $288,000.00 in closing costs had 
already been incurred for the jumbo loan, and that he and Currier 
were seeking a lender for the $288,000.00. The telephone conver-
sation was taped, and subsequently used to induce the various par-
ties to enter into the transaction, but the tape was never produced. 
Sorenson and his attorney also went to Pasadena, California 
and met with Currier. Currier represented to them that the 
V 
proceeds of the jumbo loan would be used to fund smaller loans 
and agreed to pay a bonus of $1 million if Sorenson could obtain 
£/ 
a lender for the $288,000.00. 
The testimony of Sorenson was that prior to this transaction 
he had no experience as a loan broker, or as a banker or financier 
or similar qualifications. 
2. The Advance of $288,000.00 by Christenson. Sorenson was 
then recommended or referred to Christenson "by one of my former 
missionaries . . . Victor Juarez, who is an accountant down in Utah 
£/ 
County." Sorenson played the taped telephone conversation with 
Sorenson depo. No. 2, pp . 11-14. 
Z a b r i s k i e depo. No. 2, pp . 7-15, 33-34; Sorenson depo. No. 2, pp . 17 -21 . 
7 Sorenson depo. No. 2, p . 1 1 . 
g 
Sorenson depo. No. 2, p. 40; Zabriskie depo. No. 2, p. 14. 
9 
N. Christenson depo., p. 8. See also Sorenson depo. No. 1, p. 17. 
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Teplitz and Currier for Christenson. At page 4 of the Memorandum 
Opinion, the trial judge concluded that "thereafter Plaintiff 
Security Funding agreed to loan $288,000.00 for closing costs if 
such a loan was sufficiently collateralized." Sorenson represented 
that Christenson would obtain the $1 million "bonus" promised by 
10/ 
Currier. 
3. Currier's Property was the Primary Security. Sorenson 
testified, and it is uncontroverted, that at the time Christenson 
agreed to the loan he had not contacted the McDonalds about the 
$288,000.00 or requested that they furnish any security. "Linda 
11/ [Currier]'s property was supposed to be the first collateral" 
and the trust deed on McDonalds' property was obtained subsequently 
as additional and secondary security: 
Now the reason that was done, we felt at the 
time that Linda's property, based on what she 
told us, would cover it. But again, there was 
no time to pull all your title searches and 
everything on her property. So the reason we 
put up Howard McDonald's property was to cover 
in case what we were being told wasn't true. 
(Sorenson depo. No. 1, pp. 40-41) 
The Currier property was eventually given as security, by way 
of a quit-claim deed, at the time of closing. 
4. Furnishing of Additional Collateral by the McDonalds. 
"Sorenson then turned to Defendant McDonald[s] as the source of 
additional collateral for the loan from [Christenson] for Currier's 
closing costs." (Mem. Op. 4.) It was an uncontroverted fact, 
adopted by the trial judge as a finding, that "Sorenson represented 
°R. Christenson depo. pp. 14-15; N. Christenson depo. pp. 9-10. 
Sorenson depo. No. 1, pp. 22, 40; Sorenson depo. No. 2, p. 69. 
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to McDonald[s] that by providing the collateral it would ultimately 
obtain its loan from the proceeds of the Currier loan, plus a 
12/ 
substantial bonus to be paid by Currier." 
In response to those representations, the McDonalds gave their 
note in the amount of $288,000.00 (though in fact nothing was paid 
to the McDonalds) and their trust deed in favor of Security Funding 
to secure it. The trial judge also found it to be a fact that the 
McDonalds "understood that the proceeds of the loan which its 
trust deed and note secured would be paid to another person to be 
used as closing costs for the Currier loan" (emphasis added) (Mem. 
Op. 4) and repeated that conclusion at Mem. Op. 7. 
5. Misapplication of the $288,000.00. Neil P. Christenson 
testified that when he agree.d to put up the $288,000.00, he under-
stood that the loan would close in a ten-day period and sent 
Christenson1s representative, Dave Garrett, to New Jersey to handle 
the closing: 
A It was proposed that the loan would go 
down immediately and would be about a ten-day 
period. And they felt that this could be done, 
and that's why we sent our representative back, 
Dave Garrett back east and into the Bahamas to 
put down the loan, all in the same trip. 
Q So, he went to New Jersey and then to 
the Bahamas? 
A Uh huh. (N. Christenson depo., p. 10) 
Sorenson also stressed that Christenson1s agent, Garrett, was to 
make sure the funds were properly applied: 
Q Do you recall where the meeting with 
Neil Christenson was? 
12 
Sorenson depo. No. 2, pp. 60-62; H. McDonald depo., pp. 16-17, 28-3 2; 
S. McDonald depo., pp. 14, 29-30. 
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A In his office. 
Q And who was there? 
A There was Neil Christenson, Dean Zabriski, 
Don Winters, myself, and basically everybody in 
Neil's office. 
* * * 
A Yeah, we played them the tape, answered 
some questions, and they asked us to leave the 
room. We left the room, and they said that when 
they they asked us to come back in, that 
basically they were going to put the money in 
based on the fact that one member of their cffice 
could go back to where the money was going to go 
and make sure that everything was legitimate. 
* * * 
A Yeah, Camden, New Jersey; that!s correct. 
I can remember the house we were in. 
Q Do you recall who was supposed to go 
tack to Camden, New Jersey with you from Secur-
ity Funding? 
* * * 
A Yeah, Dave Garrett. (Sorenson depo. 
No. 1, pp. 18-19) 
It was thus uncontroverted that the $288,000.00 was to be held in 
escrow: 
Q Did you feel that the $28 8,000.00 was 
going to be held in escrow? 
A I felt that the $288,000.00 was going 
to be held in escrow up to the time that every-
thing was ready to close, which was to have been 
a period of about three days. 
* * * 
Q Were you concerned about the $288,000.00 
escaping without the transaction being closed? 
* * * 
A I expressed that concern to Mr. Teplitz 
- 10 -
and was in the room and Dave Garrett was in 
the room and Dean and Don Winters was in the room, 
Q Okay. And what in essence did you ex-
press? What did you say? 
A I basically said, and said that there 
should be some sort of proof of a closing before 
any money's released* 
Q So, was it your understanding at that 
time the money would be expended or held in 
escrow? 
A It was still my understanding that for 
a period of time the money would be held in es-
crow. 
Q What period of time? 
A Twenty-Four to 48 hours. (Sorenson depo. 
No. 2, pp. 25-28) 
An escrow was never established, however. Christenson, after 
conferring with Garrett, simply transmitted the $288,000.00 to 
13/ 14/ 
"Sasha Teplitz1 accounts," before there had been any closing. 
The foregoing facts relative to the role of Garrett and 
the failure to establish an escrow are uncontroverted, although 
not referred to in any way in the Memorandum Opinion. 
6. The Trip to the Bahamas for the "Closing". The pot of 
gold at the end of a rainbow alluded to by Judge Murphy never ma-
terialized. After the payment of $28 8,000.00 to the account of 
"Forex Monetary, Ltd." in New Jersey, Teplitz, Garrett, Currier 
and others took a trip to the Bahamas where the "closing" was to 
have occurred. Garrett and Currier stayed there for several days, 
13Sorenson depo. No. 2, p. 26. 
14Garrett depo., pp. 24-25. 
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paying their expenses with Currier's credit card, while she gave 
a series of excuses why the loan never closed. Finally, they re-
turned to the United States without the jumbo loan. What happened 
to the $288,000.00 has never been disclosed. 
7. Renegotiation of the Currier Transaction. Christenson 
subsequently agreed with Currier, long after the promised closing 
had failed to occur, to extend the time for her performance beyond 
the ten days in which the McDonalds were told the transaction 
would be completed. Christenson substituted warranty deeds on 
Currier's properties as part of that transaction for the quit-
claim deeds originally obtained and as an inducement Currier in-
creased Christenson's promised bonus to One Million Five Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($1,500,000.00). The McDonalds were not informed 
of the new warranty deeds, or the promise of an increase in the 
"bonus," until about a year after the date of their note and 
trust deed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The failure of Christenson to establish an escrow, and 
see that the $288,000.00 was applied to closing of the Currier 
loan, was the actual "cause" of the loss. The failure of Chris-
tenson to act fairly and in good faith in that regard therefore 
bars its claim under the doctrine of "unclean hands." 
B. Christenson had a duty of good faith and fail dealing 
with respect to the McDonalds under UCC § 1-203, which was 
breached by the failure to see that the reasonable expectations 
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of the McDonalds were satisfied. "Bad faith" for purposes of 
UCC § 1-203 is satisfied by inaction with respect to establishment 
of an escrow or assuring that the $288,000.00 was applied to 
closing the Currier loan. Christenson was a "fiduciary" in that 
regard, or at least bound to act with honesty and competence. 
C. The promise to pay the closing costs on the Currier loan, 
not the payment of $288,000.00 by Christenson, was the "consider-
ation" for the McDonalds1 note and trust deed. The holding of the 
trial court that the mere giving of value to a third person was 
"consideration" is therefore in error. It was further necessary 
that such payment be as and for the "bargain" of the McDonalds, 
viz., that the closing costs on the Currier loan, from which the 
McDonalds were to obtain financing, be paid. Otherwise, the nec-
essary reciprocal relation of promise and inducement is not pres-
ent. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 2d § 71. 
D. Extension of Currier's time for payment, increasing the 
"bonus" payable to Christenson, and substitution of new collateral, 
without the knowledge or consent of the McDonalds, effects a 
release of the obligation of the McDonalds as a guarantor. UCC § 
3-606. 
E. Costs awarded for duplication of depositions previously 
conducted by predecessor counsel were improper. 
ARGUMENT 
The facts reveal a fairly common scam, familiar to Utahns in 
recent years as an "advance fee loan scheme." Teplitz is actually 
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an alias for "Sidney Litt", who has since been convicted of similar 
schemes and at the time of trial was serving time in the federal 
15/ 
penitentiary in Kentucky. This Court's task, therefore, is to 
determine who, among the common victims of a fraudulent scheme, 
must bear the loss. 
The Memorandum Opinion of the distinguished trial judge 
approached that task with a preoccupation over the questions of 
whether Sorenson was agent for or "acting on behalf of" the 
McDonalds and the fact that Stevenson McDonald made a correction 
in his deposition (as the Rules of Procedure accord him the right 
to do) to clarify the quality of Sorensonfs status. (Mem. Op. 2-3.) 
Both of those matters are, we submit, irrelevant. There was no 
finding that Sorenson was agent for or "acting on behalf of" the 
McDonalds in his contacts with Christenson and it would be of 
little consequence whether Sorenson was agent for or acting on 
behalf of the McDonalds when he first contacted Currier. The Mem-
orandum Opinion correctly acknowledges that the changes in the 
deposition were of no consequence. The proper question is the 
terms of the McDonalds1 agreement. The agreement is the same, 
whether entered into directly or through Sorenson acting as agent, 
and the $288,000.00 is "consideration" only as and to the extent 
that it was paid in accordance with McDonalds1 "bargain". 
Whether Sorenson was McDonalds1 agent is also of no conse-
quence to whether Christenson acted in good faith under the agree-
Judicial notice of these matters may be taken from Criminal Case No. 
8200153, United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Litt 
was indicted for mail fraud, 7 counts, wire fraud, 9 counts, failure to file 
federal income tax, 3 counts, interstate transportation of stolen property, 6 
counts, and other crimes, convicted and incarcerated at Lexington, Kentucky. 
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ment. There is no claim that the McDonalds, acting directly or 
through Sorenson, excused any performance that the law requires, 
or could do so. 
POINT I 
Christenson1s Cause of the Loss, By Failing 
to Establish a Proper Escrow, Amounts to "Unclean Hands." 
As in any commercial dispute, particularly one involving co-
victims of a fraud, it is important to consider the actual Cause 
of the loss. The Memorandum Opinion never reached that question, 
having concluded — erroneously, we submit — that Christenson had 
no "duty," vis-a-vis, the McDonalds. This Court need not pause 
in that regard, however, for the stipulated evidence conclusively 
establishes Christenson1s responsibility for the loss. 
A. There Was Neither an Escrow Nor a "Closing." 
The evidence is clear, uncontroverted, and acknowledged in 
the Memorandum Opinion, that Christenson was to apply the 
$288,000.00 to the closing of the Currier loan and to establish an 
escrow to accomplish the payment of the "closing costs:" 
A It was proposed that the loan would go 
down immediately and would be about a ten-day 
period. And they felt tnat this could be done, 
ana that1s why we sent our representative back, 
Dave Garrett back east and into the Bahamas to 
put down the loan, all in the same trip. 
(Emphasis added.) (N. Christenson depo., p. 10) 
The uncontroverted evidence is that it was Christenson1s duty to 
establish the escrow. 
Q Did you feel that the $288,000.00 was 
going to be held in escrow? 
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A I felt that the $288,000.00 was going 
to be held in escrow up to the time that every-
thing was ready to close, which was to have 
been a period of about three days. 
* * * 
Q And what was your understanding as to 
who the escrow was? 
A I was -- it was my understanding that 
the escrow account was Sasha Teplitz' accounts. 
Q You felt that Sasha Teplitz was acting 
as an escrow agent? 
A Yes. 
* * * 
Q What, specifically, were they going 
to do? 
A They were going to place $288,000 into 
the hands of Sasha Teplitz after they sent some-
body back and confirmed that they felt that 
things were as they said they were on the tape. 
(Sorenson depo. No. 1, pp. 25-27, 34.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
Christenson failed entirely in that obligation. The evidence is 
clear, and uncontroverted that the $288,000.00 was never placed in 
an escrow of any description: 
Q What kind of an account was set up to 
receive those funds? 
A I don't know what kind of account it was. 
Q You didn't ever go to the bank and check 
that out? Did you see any escrow agreement with 
the bank? 
A No. (Garrett depo., p. 15.) 
Neither did Christenson undertake to see that the $2 88,00 0.00 was 
applied to "closing" of the Currier loan: 
Q And what was the purpose in going to 
Nassau? 
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A We were invited by Linda [Currier] to 
go to the closing of the loan. 
Q So, you expected the loan to close in 
Nassau? 
A Yes. 
Q You also expected that the $288,000,00 
would be expended before the closing of the loan? 
A Uh huh. 
Q Why didn't it happen? 
A I have no idea. 
Q Did she give you any ideas then? 
A She [Currier] spoke of delays for 
various reasons which I can't remember. I 
don't know why it didn't close. 
Q Did you take any action when it didn't 
close timely in Nassau? 
A No. (Emphasis added.) (Garrett depo., 
pp. 22, 24-25.) 
In fact, the money was not even paid to Currier, Teplitz, or any-
one remotely connected with the bargain of the McDonalds: 
Q The money was disbursed somehow to 
this bank in New Jersey to an account that you 
can't really identify now? 
A I Know the name of the account. 
Q You say you do? 
A Un huh. Forex Monetary Ltd. 
Q What kind of an account was that? 
A Maybe we're not communicating. I 
don't know what kind of a bank account it was. 
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Q Was it a savings account, an escrow 
account, a trust account? 
A I don't have any idea. (Garrett depo., 
p. 21.) 
The eventual cause of the loss of the $288,000.00, therefore, 
was the failure of Christenson, acting directly and through its 
agent, Garrett, to see that adequate escrow arrangements were en-
tered into or other arrangements made to assure that the $288,000.00 
was applied to the closing of the Currier loan: 
Q Who directed Security Funding as to 
where to send their $288,000? 
A Dave Garrett was on one end of the phone 
in Camden and somebody was on the end of the phone 
up here. And to the best of my recollection, 
Sasha was telling Dave Garrett where the money 
was supposed to go and how it was supposed 
to be wired. (Sorenson depo., p. 17/) 
Indeed, merely wiring the $288,000.00 to Forex Monetary, Ltd. 
— an apparent stranger — does not satisfy the requirements of an 
"escrow": 
For the instrument to operate as an escrow there 
must be: 
(a) An agreement as to the subject matter 
and delivery of the instrument; 
(b) There must be a third-party depository; 
(c) There must be delivery of the instrument 
to a third party conditioned upon the performance 
of some act on the happening of this event; and 
(d) The relinquishment by the guarantor. 
Menkis v. Whitestone Sav. & Loan Association, 
356 N.Y.S.2d 485, 487-8 (N.Y. 1974). 
Christenson now seeks to impose its loss resulting from its 
failure to establish a proper escrow or to properly apply the 
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money on the McDonalds. 
B. Christenson*s Claim is Barred by "Unclean Hands." 
The doctrine in pari delicto, or unclean hands, has applica-
tion here. It is familiar doctrine in equity that even "in a case 
of equal or mutual fault . . . the condition of the [defending 
party] is the better one" and "the law will leave the case as it 
finds it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979). The concept 
is stated, in terms appropriate to the facts herein, at Keystone 
Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933): 
This court has declared: "It is a principle 
in chancery, that he who asks relief must 
have acted in good faith. The equitable 
powers of this court can never be exerted in 
behalf of one who has acted fraudulently or 
who by deceit or any unfair means has gained 
an advantage. To aid a party in such a case 
would make this court the abetter of iniquity." 
The unclean hands and in pari delicto maxims operate against 
conduct which is contrary to the dictates of good conscience and 
fair dealing. 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 92-94 (5th ed. 1941). 
For a case arising in Utah applying the doctrine by way of dicta 
to a mortgage foreclosure and issues of "good faith" see Deseret 
Apartments v. United States, 250 F.2d 457, 458 (10th Cir. 1957). 
This Court has applied the doctrine in a case involving failure 
of consideration. Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454 (Utah 1982) 
(dicta). C£. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976). The 
doctrine has particular application where, as here, the unfair con-
duct of the claimant results in a direct injury to the defendant. 
Park v. Jameson, 364 P.2d 1 (Utah 1961). 
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Analogy to a mortgage transaction for the purchase of a home 
is apt. Would such a commercial borrower be obligated if the 
lending institution failed to establish a proper escrow and applied 
the construction money to the wrong party? Could the hands of 
such a lender, having failed to exercise care to see the money 
properly applied, be considered "clean"? We submit that the Memo-
randum Opinion errs in concluding that such an improper payment, 
in this case to the order of Teplitz rather than for the closing 
of a loan, amounts to "consideration" in the legal sense (see 
Point III, infra) or was "good faith" in any sense of that term 
(see Point II, infra). 
POINT II 
The Trial Court Erroneously Excused Christenson 
of its Legal "Duty" of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The cryptic holding that "there is no evidence to support any 
claim of a duty owed by any Plaintiff to Defendant" (Mem, Op. 7) 
is error — as a matter of law, for it ignores well established 
principles of lender's liability. The further holding that "such 
a duty is a necessary predicate to Defendant's negligence counter-
claim," coupled with the uncontroverted fact that Christenson 
failed to establish a proper escrow for the $288,000.00, compels 
the conclusion that Christenson1s conduct was the actual cause of 
the loss. 
A. Contract Law Imposes Firm Duties Between Contracting Parties. 
It is error to assume, as the Memorandum Opinion does, that a 
lender has no duty of good faith and fair dealing to a guarantor 
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such as the McDonalds. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 2d § 205 plainly 
declares otherwise: 
Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Every 
contract imposes upon each party a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing in its perform-
ance and its enforcement. 
To the same effect, UCC Section 1-203, UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1-203, 
declares that "[e]very contract or duty within this act imposes an 
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." The 
UCC provision has special application, for the note given by the 
McDonalds to support the trust deed was subject to the UCC pro-
visions. 
This Court has implicitly recognized the duty defined by the 
Restatement and the UCC. Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Utah 
Security Mortgage, Inc., 701 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1985) (dicta, defense 
waived under UCC § 9-207). See also, Clayton v. Crossroads Equip-
ment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982) (punitive damages for bad 
faith foreclosure on a combine during harvest season). 
1. Facts Concerning Breach of Christenson1s "Duty" are Agreed 
— and Determined by the Trial Court. Stressing that the $288,000.00 
"would be paid to another person" (Mem. Op. 4) and "that [McDonald] 
knew and understood that [the $288,000.00] would be paid, not to it, 
but to someone else" (Mem. Op. 6-7) fails to explain away the duty 
Christenson owed to the McDonalds, or even deal with the elements 
of that duty. 
Certainly the McDonalds knew and understood that the funds 
Christenson paid would go to a third person. That knowledge is 
fundamental to being a surety, indemnitor or guarantor. The 
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McDonalds1 expectation, nevertheless, was that their property was 
pledged only if the funds being guaranteed were applied to closing 
the Currier loan so that they could get their $3 million loan. 
It was, in fact, agreed, and found as a fact by the trial judge, 
that the McDonalds pledged their property only in the expectation 
of receiving financing from Currier's jumbo loan. Indeed, each 
of the foregoing holdings relative to payment to a third person 
are coupled with the finding that the funds were "to be used as 
closing costs for the Currier loan" (Mem. Op. 4) and were "for use 
as closing costs on the Currier loan." (Mem. Op. 7.) 
It was agreed, further, that Christenson would undertake to 
see that the $288,000.00 was properly applied by establishing an 
escrow. Christenson dispatched its agent, Garrett, to Camden, 
New Jersey, and then to the Bahamas for that purpose, but the 
agreed fact is that rather than establish an escrow Christenson 
simply wired the $288,000.00 directly to an apparent stranger to 
the transaction. 
2. Christenson Failed to Act with "Good Faith". The meaning 
of "good faith," appropos the inaction of Christenson in establish-
ing an escrow or applying the $288,000.00 to a "closing," is de-
fined at RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 2d § 205, comments a and d: 
Comment a. Meanings of "good faith." 
" I ] [G]ood faith performance or enforce-
ment of a contract emphasizes faithfulness 
to an agreed common purpose and consistency 
with the justified expectations of the 
other party . . . . 
* * * 
Comment d. Good faith performance . . . bad 
faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, 
and fair dealing may require more than honesty. 
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Christenson1s conduct, vis-a-vis the escrow and closing, plainly 
frustrated the McDonalds1 "justified expectations11 under the con-
tract, and was the epitome of "inaction." Christenson1s agent, 
Garrett, made clear that he was given no instructions that would 
satisfy Christenson1s obligation of good faith, and was unqualified 
to do so even if he had: 
A We were looking for—we didnft know 
what we were looking for in terms of verifi-
cation. We're very unsophisticated at this type 
of thing. 
0 What was your specific charge from Mr. 
Christenson before going back there? What did 
he tell you to do? 
A Check it out. 
* * * 
Q Okay. Then I'm interested in finding 
out what you were looking for in Camden, New 
Jersey. 
A I didn't know what I was looking for. 
I was going back to check it out as best I could. 
Being unsophisticated and to give ourselves some 
degree of assurance that what we were doing was 
going to work. (Garrett depo. pp. 18-19.) 
Garrett's appraisal of his lack of ability was certainly accurate. 
He is a high school dropout (who enrolled at BYU for a short time 
16/ 
on the recommendation of his Mission President, Neil Christenson). 
Moreover, Christenson failed to discharge its duty entirely and 
merely wired the $288,000.00 to a stranger named "Forex Monetary, 
Ltd.": 
Q And those [two promissory notes] t o t a l 
$288,000, i s t h a t cor rec t? 
A Tha t ' s c o r r e c t . 
'Ga r r e t t d e p o . , p . 6. 
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Q Was that amount then wired to [the ac-
count of Forex Monetary, Ltd., at] the Bank of 
New Jersey in Camden? 
A Yes. 
Q Who authorized that wire? 
A Neil Christenson. (Garrett depo., p. 11.) 
Thus Garrett was sent to Camden, New Jersey, to assure that 
17/ 
the transaction was "legitimate," but when he got there he — 
and Neil Christenson — displayed faithlessness and lack of regard 
for the justified expectations of those they had contracted with. 
They resolved to go ahead with the transaction, even though they 
doubted its legitimacy, because they believed any loss would fall, 
not on themselves, but on the McDonalds. 
Q Did you have some suspicions about 
the loan? Did you think it was worth doing? 
A Oh, we were, I think, through the whole 
process we were unsure of the loan. I think you 
always are. But because we considered ourselves 
fully protected with collateral, we made the 
loan. 
* * * 
Q So, what triggered in your mind that it 
was all right to tell Neil Christenson every-
thing's fine, send money, or something to that 
effect? 
A It was really triggered on both ends. 
The primary factor for Security Funding was the 
loan properly collateralized. Since we had 
collateral with Howard [McDonald] and since the 
collateral was forthcoming with Mountain West, 
and in order to further secure our interest, 
Currier volunteered her property, we could see 
no reason not to make the loan. (Garrett depo., 
pp. 13, 16.) 
Garrett depo., p. 12. 
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It is important to observe that Neil F. Christenson was the 
party on the other "end" of the telephone, and he therefore acted 
directly to shift the burden for loss to the McDonalds. It would 
therefore be hard to deny that Christenson disregarded its duty 
of "good faith" or satisfied the obligation of "fair dealing" in 
relation to the escrow and closing. The agreed evidence is that 
Christenson did not even establish an escrow and there was never 
a closing. 
Indeed, Christenson did not even identify the account to which 
the $288,000.00 was wired, and did not care because Neil Christenson 
believed the loss would fall on the McDonalds. CE. UCC § 9-207(1), 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9-207(1): 
A secured party must use reasonable care 
in the custody and preservation of col-
lateral in his possession . . . . 
This Court observed in the Clayton case, supra, at 112 8, 
that 
[T]he obvious purpose of requiring that a 
secured party act in good faith is to im-
pose the basic obligation of fair dealing, 
and to protect the purchaser from the mere 
whim or caprice of the secured party. 
That obligation was callously disregarded by Christenson. 
3. "Lender's Liability" is Imposed in Numerous Related Con-
texts. Other jurisdictions have given literal effect to UCC § 
1-203's duty of good faith dealing in all contracts, e.g., Cohen 
v. Rattnoff, 147 Cal. App.3d 321 (1983): 
In every contract there is an implied covenant 
that neither party shall do anything that will 
have the effect of destroying or injuring the 
right of the other party to receive the fruits 
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of the contract, which means that in every con-
tract there exists an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. . . . 
This covenant not only imposes upon each con-
tracting party the duty to refrain from doing 
anything which would render performance of the 
contract impossible by any act of his own, but 
also the duty to do everything that the contract 
presupposes that he will do to accomplish its 
purpose. 
As the Illinois Court has held: 
Good faith between contracting parties requires 
the party vested with contractual discretion to 
exercise it reasonably, and he may not do so 
arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner incon-
sistent with the reasonable expectations of the 
parties. (Citations omitted.) Carrico v. Delp, 
490 N.E.2d 972, 976 (111. 1986). 
"Good faith" requires "decency, fairness or reasonableness in per-
formance or enforcement" of a contract. R. Eisenberg, Good Faith 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971). 
This Court has applied that standard in Williamson v. Wanlass, 
545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976) to bar enforcement of strict forfeiture 
provisions in a contract after the obligee accepted and retained 
late payments. See also, 999 v. C.I.T. Corp., 776 F.2d 866 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (negligent misrepresentation in a loan commitment); 
K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(lender liable for change in policy re. extension of credit); 
Brown v. Avemco Investment Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(due on sale clause unenforceable if repayment is unimpaired); 
Skeels v^ Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 
1964) (foreclosure on dealers automobiles without notice and in 
disregard of oral credit commitments refused); Yanktown Production 
Credit Assfn. v. Larsen, 365 N.W.2d 430 (Neb. 1985) (bad faith 
- 26 -
failure to honor loan commitment); First National Bank v. 
Twombley, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984) (refusal to convert principal 
payment into an installment loan); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 
P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983) (repossession without notice); State 
National Bank v. Farahh Manufacturing Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 
App. 1984). 
The implications of the Memorandum Opinion are shocking. 
Does the trial judge mean to say, really, that the mere payment of 
$288,000.00 by Christenson, to anyone and for any purpose, would 
satisfy the obligation of good faith and fair dealing simply be-
cause the McDonalds knew it would be paid to a third person? That 
is the necessary consequence of the holding, precisely. 
B. Christenson had the Duty of a "Fiduciary". 
The Memorandum Opinion's casual holding of "no evidence to 
support any claim of a duty owed by any plaintiff to defendant" 
(Mem. Op. 7) also ignores the McDonalds1 claim that Christenson 
"took upon themselves a fiduciary obligation . . . and violated 
18/ 
their fiduciary obligations." In fact, the circumstances of the 
McDonalds1 delivery of trust deeds to the McDonald Bros.1 property 
Christenson, to secure closing costs on a loan and the promise of 
$3 million in financing, created a classic "resulting trust." 
See RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 404: 
Where Resulting Trust Arises. A resulting 
trust arises where a person makes or causes 
to be made a disposition of property under 
circumstances which raise an inference that 
18 
See Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Dismissal and Summary Judgment, p. S. 
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he does not intend that the person taking 
or holding the property should have the 
beneficial interest therein, unless the 
inference is rebutted or the beneficial 
interest is otherwise effectively disposed 
of. 
Christenson1s role in handling the escrow and closing was 
not unlike that of a real estate agent or broker in closing the 
sale of a home or business. This Court has variously held such 
agents to be fiduciaries, in the classic sense, Hopkins v. Wardley 
Corp., 611 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Utah 1980); Latimer v^ Katz, 508 P.2d 
542, 544 (Utah 1973); Holland v. Moreton, 353 P.2d 989, 995 (Utah 
1960); Reese v^ Harper, 329 P.2d 410 (Utah 1958), or at least 
"required to meet standards of 'honesty, integrity, truthfulness, 
reputation and competency.1" (Emphasis added.) Dugan v. Jones, 
615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980). Under either formulation of the 
standard, Christenson had a duty and its failure to establish an 
escrow or pay the $288,000.00 over at a "closing" failed to meas-
ure up to the requisite "competence." 
POINT III 
The Memorandum Opinion Errs on the Issue 
of "Consideration" 
The most basic and fundamental error of the trial court is 
its conclusion concerning "consideration" at page 6 of the Memoran-
dum Opinion: 
[T]he evidence is undisputed that Plaintiff 
Security Funding provided good and adequate 
consideration for the trust deed and note by 
payment of $288,000.00. The evidence is 
undisputed that Defendant knew and understood 
that this consideration would be paid, not to 
it, but to someone else . . . . 
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The explicit assumption of the Memorandum Opinion, therefore, is 
that the payment of $288,000.00 by Christenson was "consideration" 
in the legal sense. That conclusion, vis-a-vis "consideration," 
is incorrect according to the agreed facts, and in error as a 
matter of law to the extent that it ignores the "bargained for" 
element of contract consideration. Far from being "undisputed," 
the McDonalds vigorously argued that there was no "consideration" 
in their motion for summary judgment, and again in their motion 
for reconsideration. 
The "consideration" necessary to support Christenson1s claim 
is defined at RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 2d § 71: 
§ 71. Requirement of Exchange; Type of Exchange. 
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance 
or a return promise must be bargained for. 
(2) A performance or return promise is bar-
gained for if it is sought by the promisor in 
exchange for his promise and is given by the 
promisee in exchange for that promise. 
See also 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 2, 2A (3d ed. 1957); 1 CORBIN 
ON CONTRACTS § 10 (1963). 
The $288,000.00 paid to Forex Monetary, Ltd., at the order of 
Teplitz, was "consideration" only if it was applied in the manner 
and for the purposes for which the McDonalds agreed to furnish 
security. Clearly it was not. 
A. A "Reciprocal Bargain" is Essential to "Consideration." 
The consideration issue is properly resolved by looking to 
the note the trust deed was to secure. If the note was without 
consideration, so is the trust deed, for this Court has declared 
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that " . . . where there is no debt, there can be no mortgage." 
Thomas v^ _ Ogden State Bank, 80 Utah 138, 13 P.2d 636, 640 (1932). 
The note in the amount of $28 8,000.00, attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A", recites that it was given "for value received." The 
"value" contemplated was plainly not the receipt of $288,000.00, 
for Christenson agreed that no monies were ever paid to the 
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McDonalds. The "consideration" plainly was the promise of 
Christenson to pay the closing costs on the Currier loan, so that 
the McDonalds could obtain their $3 million financing., Just as 
plainly, if the promise failed, then the note was without consid-
eration and the trust deed securing it was unenforceable. 
It is variously stated and universally held that the mere 
fact that a person gave something of value, whether cash or a 
promise, does not amount to consideration unless it is regarded 
as such by both parties. "[N]othing can be treated as a consid-
eration. . . that is not intended as such by the parties." 
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 100 at p. 337. See also, Fire Ins. Assn. 
v. Wickham,141 U.S. 564, 579 (1891): 
Thus in Philpot v. Gruninger, 81 U.S. 14 Wall. 
570, 577 [20: 743, 744], it is stated that 
"nothing is consideration that is not regarded 
as such by both parties." To constitute a 
valid agreement there must be a meeting of minds 
upon every feature and element of such agreement, 
of which the consideration is one. The mere 
presence of some incident to a contract which 
might under certain circumstances be upheld as 
a consideration for a promise, does not necess-
arily make it the consideration for the promise 
in that contract. To give it that effect it 
must have been offered by one party and accented 
by the other as one element of the contract. In 
Kilpatrick v. Muirhead, 16 Pa. 117, it was said 
that "consideration, like every other part of a 
contract, must be the result of agreement; the 
9N. Christenson depo., p. 19. 
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parties must understand and be influenced to the 
particular action by something of value or con-
venience and inconvenience recognized by all of 
them as the moving cause. That which is a mere 
fortuitous result following accidentally from 
an arrangement, but in no degree promoting the 
actors to it, is not to be esteemed a legal con-
sideration. " 
See also, 59 CJS Mortgages §§ 87 and 141. The rule has been 
applied in various contexts related to the facts herein. In 
Silver Waters Corp. v. Murphy, 177 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1965) a mortgage 
was held unenforceable where the orginal mortgagee had failed to 
make agreed-upon advances to the mortgagor. In Benson v. Andrews, 
138 Cal.2d 123, 292 P.2d 39 (1955), a note and mortgage were held 
unenforceable because the original mortgagee had failed to perform 
its promise to complete construction. The trial court thus erred 
in assuming that the mere payment of $288,000.00 by Christenson 
amounted to "consideration", for it was also necessary that the 
$288,000.00 be paid as and for the promise to pay the closing costs 
on the Currier loan. As the North Dakota court said in construing 
notes given to secure the payment of bail: 
The notes were not to be paid as a consider-
ation for his promise [to furnish bail], 
but only on the contingency that he advanced 
monies and suffered loss on account of such 
bail. . . and under this record such con-
tingency never arose. Grebe v. Swords, 149 
N.W. 126, 129 (N.D. 191TT 
The "promise" decidedly was not that Christenson would pay 
$288,000.00 to Forex Monetary, Ltd., to the order of Teplitz or to 
some "third party" — it just as plainly was that the closing 
costs on the Currier loan would be paid so that the McDonalds 
could secure their $3 million loan. Indeed, the Memorandum Opinion 
itself recites that "Sorenson represented to Defendant McDonald 
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that by providing the collateral it would ultimately obtain its 
loan from the proceeds of the Currier loan . . . ." (Mem. Op. 4) 
and that the note and trust deed was "to be used as closing costs 
for the Currier loan." Id. 
The promise failed entirely, for "the Currier loan was never 
consummated." (Mem. Op. 5.) The McDonalds never received their 
promised $3 million. Mere recitation that the $288,000.00 was to 
be paid to "someone else" (Mem. Op. p. 7) does not avoid that de-
fect, for the "promise" — acknowledged by the Memorandum Opinion 
— was that it was to be "use[d] as closing costs on the Currier 
loan." IcJ. Unless and until that promise was satisfied there was 
no consideration. 
Comment b. to RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 71 explains the "bar-
gained for" concept in terms appropos this case: 
b. "Bargained f o r . " . . . the consideration 
and the promise bear a reciprocal relation of 
motive or inducement: the consideration in-
duces the making of the promise and the prom-
ise induces the furnishing of the consideration. 
The giving of something by Christenson, no matter how valuable, 
and even if given in good faith reliance on McDonalds" promise, 
is not consideration for the promise of the McDonalds unless the 
reciprocal relation of motive and inducement are present. Comment 
b. further explains: 
. . .[I]t is not enough that the promise 
induces the conduct of the promisee or that 
the conduct of the promisee induces the 
making of the promise; both elements must 
be present, or there is no bargain. 
Expressed in terms of the Restatement, McDonalds1 promise, induced 
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by Sorenson's solicitation, plainly was not to be obligated for 
$288,000.00 if Christenson paid that amount to some third party. 
Christenson1s motive may have been that McDonalds be so obligated, 
but there was no reciprocal relation of McDonalds' promise to that 
expectation. The promise of payment of the closing costs on 
Currierfs loan so that a $3 million loan would become available to 
the McDonalds was plainly the inducement to McDonalds1 promise, and 
the only performance that would satisfy the reciprocal relation-
ship necessary to the "bargained for" element of consideration was 
(1) the payment of the closing costs on the jumbo loan so that 
(2) there could be a $3 million loan to the McDonalds. 
B. The Facts Recited in the Memorandum Opinion Repudiate 
"Consideration." 
Indeed, the conclusion of the Memorandum Opinion is irrecon-
cilable with the facts recited in the Memorandum Opinion itself. 
At page 4 the Memorandum Opinion recites that "Defendant understood 
that the proceeds of the loan which its Trust Deed and Note secured 
would be paid to another person to b£ used as closing costs for 
the Currier loan." (Emphasis added.) Again at page 6 the trial 
court observed that "[t]he evidence is undisputed that Defendant 
knew and understood that this consideration would be paid, not to 
it, but to someone else for use as closing costs on the Currier 
loan." (Bnphasis added.) The trial court was certainly correct — 
in both instances -- but the Memorandum Opinion errs in that it 
fails to take account that the proceeds of the McDonalds1 Trust 
Deed and Note were not used "as closing costs for the Currier 
loan," but were misapplied to other purposes never contemplated 
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by Christenson or Sorenson or contracted for by the McDonalds, 
The trial court apparently assumed that because it was undis-
puted that something of value passed from Christenson, it was 
also "undisputed" that Christenson. gave "good and adequate con-
sideration" (Mem. Op. 6). To the contrary, the conclusion that 
there was "consideration" was vigorously disputed during the pro-
ceedings on Christenson1s motion. In that regard the trial court 
failed to consider that such value was not "consideration," at 
least with respect to the promise of the McDonalds, because it 
was not "bargained for." That defect in the Memorandum Opinion's 
reasoning was forcefully presented to the trial judge in a Motion 
for Reconsideration with a supporting brief, but was denied with-
out comment. 
The facts in that regard are clear and uncontroverted. The 
testimony of Stevenson McDonald, relied upon in the Memorandum 
Opinion, was as follows: 
Q What did they represent they were 
going to do with the documents [viz., the note 
and trust deed]? 
A To use them for what they were pur-
ported for. 
Q What was your understanding? 
A That it was to secure the closing 
costs for the loan that they were trying to get. 
Q Did you note where they were getting 
the closing costs from? 
A The Security Funding, I guess, was 
where they were going to get to do the 
Q What did you hope to gain by giving up 
this trust deed note and trust deed and escrow 
agreement into Robert Laboreaux1 possession? 
- 34 -
A It was to get that loan consummated. 
Q Which loan? 
A The one that they were promising that 
they were going to get closed, where the funds 
were coming from. (Emphasis added.) (S. McDonald 
depo., p. 17.) 
Neil Christenson agreed that the $288,000.00 was given only as and 
for closing costs for the loan: 
A For an investment of $288,000.00, 
which they said would constitute closing costs 
for the loan. They would provide a bonus and 
an interest factor. 
Q What kind of bonus were they speaking of? 
A They were talking about a million dollar 
bonus of which a portion would be shared with 
other parties. 
Q Were you to get your $288,000.00 back or 
was that to be spent? 
A As I remember, the $288,000.00 would 
have been returned plus the million dollar bonus. 
* * * 
Q And what was your understanding as to how 
long they would have your money, the $288,000.00? 
A It. was proposed that the loan would 
go down immediately and would be about a ten-
day period . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
(N. Christenson depo., pp. 9-10.) 
The position of the McDonalds is precisely like that of one 
who negotiates for any consumer loan, such as one for the financing 
of a home previously alluded to. The lending institution may not 
claim that it gave "consideration" for a note and mortgage, trust 
deed, or similar instrument merely because it gave something of 
value to a third person, such as a materialman who may have mis-
applied the funds. The bargain of the purchaser which forms its 
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promise, like that of the McDonalds herein for the payment of 
closing costs on the jumbo loan, is for a loan for the purchase 
of a home. If the lending institution fails to see that promise 
performed, through failure to maintain a proper escrow, then there 
is a failure of consideration and no contract. 
C. Christenson1s Commitment of $288,000 Preceded the McDonalds' 
Note. 
Indeed, but a moment's reflection is necessary to demonstrate 
that the McDonalds' Note and Trust Deed could not have been given 
for the mere promise of Christenson to pay $288,000.00 to some 
undefined third party. It is uncontroverted that Christenson 
agreed to pay the $288,000.00 prior to any contract with the 
McDonalds: 
Q What, specifically, were they going 
to do? 
A They were going to place $288,000 into 
the hands of Sasha Teplitz . . . . 
Q At that point, you hadn't contacted 
McDonalds about pledging their property for 
security, had you? 
A Not when I went to Neil first time, no. 
(Sorenson depo. No. 2, p. 34.) 
POINT IV 
Change of Currier's Primary Obligation 
Released the McDonalds as Guarantors 
It is an uncontroverted fact, acknowledged in the* Memorandum 
Opinion, that subsequent to the time when the Currier loan failed 
to close, and after the ten-day period in which it was represented 
to the McDonalds that the entire transaction would be completed, 
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Christenson renegotiated the transaction with Currier. The rights 
and obligations as between Currier and Christenson were thereby 
significantly altered, including by extending the time for perfor-
mance by Currier beyond the ten days originally contemplated and 
increasing the "bonus" that was payable to Christenson from $1 mil-
lion to $1.5 million. The interim collateral furnished by Mountain 
West was also released by Christenson. 
It is familiar law in that regard that a guarantor such as the 
McDonalds is released from liability by such an extension of the 
time for payment or such unilateral changes in the primary obligation: 
Subject to some exceptions, the general rule 
is that a valid agreement between a guarantee 
and a principal for an extension of time for 
payment or performance by the principal, for 
a definite period, without the consent or 
ratification of the guarantor, releases the 
guarantor from the obligations of his guaranty, 
even though he is not in fact injured by the 
extension. 38 CJS Guaranty § 75a, 
As regards the McDonalds1 trust deed note, Section 3-6 06 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-606) codifies the 
proposition: 
Impairment of recourse or of collateral. 
(1) The holder discharges any party to the 
instrument to the extent that without such 
party's consent the holder 
(a) without express reservation of rights 
. . . agrees to suspend the right to 
enforce aqainst such person the instru-
ment or collateral . . . or 
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral 
for the instrument given by or on be-
half of the party or any person against 
who he has a right of recourse. 
The reason for the rule is well established: 
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A guarantor of a note is secondarily 
rather than primarily liable, and hence he is 
released, under the express terms of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, by any agreement 
binding on the holder to extend the time of 
payment. . . . 38 CJS Guaranty § 75a at p. 
1241. 
This Court has recently applied the doctrine, on facts parallel 
to those at bar. First National Bank v. Egbert, 663 P.2d 85 (Utah 
1983) : 
. . . The surety, then, can claim discharge 
under [§] 3-606 when, without his consent and 
without an 'express reservation of rights,1 
the creditor and debtor enter into an agree-
ment to extend time for payment. 
* * * 
Thus, by entering into an agreement extending 
the time for payment . . . without the consent 
of the sureties . . . and without an express 
reservation of rights, even though it was not 
required under the three prior notes, FNB dis-
charged Mack and Cora Egbert of any further 
liability under the first and second notes. 
See U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-3-606 (1) (a). Id. at 87. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that the rule dis-
charging the guarantor in such circumstances is "strictissimi 
juris," and that no inquiry into whether the guarantor is preju-
diced is permitted. Depositors Trust Co. v. Hudson General Corp., 
485 F.Supp. 1355 (E.D. N.Y. 1980), accord, Balinger v. Rheem Mfg. 
Co., 381 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1967) (applying New York law). In 
the matter at bar the McDonalds were in fact damaged, and grevi-
ously so. The trial court imposed judgment for $173,400 in 
interest, all of which is attributable to extension of the time 
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for performance beyond the ten days the McDonalds agreed to. 
^McDonalds agreed to a transaction that would close in 15 days, at the 
most, and obligate them to only $288,000.00. See Sorenson depo. No. 2, p. 70. 
Had it not been for that extension, and had there been a prompt 
foreclosure, it is even possible that Currierfs primary guarantee 
would have avoided any recourse to the McDonalds at all. 
The Memorandum Opinion dismisses these circumstances casually, 
with the observation that "the evidence is undisputed that Defen-
dant consented to all extensions afforded Currier and to the re-
lease of the collateral provided by others." (Mem. Op. 7.) There 
was no finding that Christenson reserved any rights against the 
McDonalds, and in fact there was no reservation, and the trial 
judge cited no evidence of a consent to the renegotiation that was 
"undisputed", and in fact there is none. The McDonalds never 
agreed to the extension of the time for Currier's performance, 
substitution of new deeds as security, or the increase in the 
bonus. To the contrary, the evidence is clear and undisputed that 
the McDonalds were never even informed that it was being renego-
tiated until about a year later. 
If the trial judge's reference was to the provisons of the 
Trust Deed Note that the makers "consent to any and all extensions 
of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be granted by 
the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions 
of this note" (see Appendix "A") that provision is of no avail. 
Plainly, the provision relates only to modifications as between 
Christenson and the McDonalds. Any effort to extend that clause 
to an obligation between Christenson and the primary obligor would 
fail for the obvious reason that it was not, and in the nature of 




Costs Awarded were Excessive and Improper 
The trial court awarded attorneys1 fees to the Plaintiffs in 
the sum of Forty-One Thousand Twenty-Two Dollars ($41,022.00) and 
costs of Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighteen Dollars and 23 Cents 
($2,818.23), which the McDonalds submit is excessive. 
Plaintiffs1 counsel should not be awarded fees for duplicating 
almost identical discovery that had been conducted prior to their 
assuming representation of Plaintiffs and for making a Motion for 
Summary Judgment which is nearly identical with the one prepared 
and argued by their predecessor counsel. That attorneys1 fees 
awarded by the trial court represent a duplication of efforts by 
prior counsel, who prepared the case for trial and prepared and 
argued a substantially identical Motion for Summary Judgment to 
Judge Judith Billings, who denied it, is evident from the two sets 
of depositions which form the Record herein. This Court has held 
that deposition costs are taxable only if they were necessarily 
incurred. Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 683 
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978). 
At the time present counsel for Christenson assumed their 
representation, the case was scheduled for trial and present coun-
sel merely duplicated the efforts of their predecessors. There 
were no witnesses called to testify and the Summary Judgment 
Motion was a nonevidentiary hearing. No subpoena costs are there-
fore recoverable. 
Costs awarded for secretarial overtime, for Lexis research, 
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copying machine costs, long distance telephone calls or other 
cost items are also improper. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court failed to observe that Christenson, rather 
than the McDonalds, actually caused the loss by its failure to 
establish an escrow or apply the $288,000.00 to "closing costs" 
on the Currier loan. For the reasons indicated, that conduct 
disregarded the duty of good faith and fair dealing between con-
tracting parties, and amounted to a failure of consideration as 
to the original promise of the McDonalds. For those reasons, to-
gether with the further reason that Christenson1s subsequent 
conduct amounted to a release of the McDonalds as Guarantors, 
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the motion 
of the McDonalds to dismiss and for summary judgment granted. 
Respectfully submitted this J?7 day of y^Z^^n , 1987. 
-3**-
Parker M. Nielson, Esq. 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Glen M. Richman, Esq. 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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(Conformed Copy) A P P E N D I X A 
TRUST DEED NOTE ~~ 
> NOT NEGOTIATE THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be 
surrendered to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
288,000.00 Salt Lake City, Utah 
August 20 , 19 81 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the 
•der of: 
lECURITY FUNDING CORPORATION PENSION PLAN as to a 2/3 beneficial interest (contribution 
1187,000.00) and to NEIL P. CHRISTENSON as to a 1/3 beneficial interest (contribution $101,000. 
'WO HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND & 00/100 DOLLARS ( $288,000.00 ) , 
jgether with interest from date at the rate of Twenty per cent ( 2!£ %) per annum 
I the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
One or more payments with the full amount together with accrued interest 
due and payable on or before November 20, 1981. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the re-
iction of principal. Any such installment not paid when due shall bear interest there-
:ter at the rate of TWENTY percent ( 20 %) per annum until paid. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest 
: any part thereof, or in the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust 
ied securing this note, the holder hereof, at its option and without notice or demand, 
ly declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal 
: interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree 
) pay all costs and expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment 
:>r payment, demand and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to 
iy and all extensions of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be granted 
{ the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and 
:> the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
MCDONALD BROTHERS, INC. 
By: 
STEVENSON McDONALD, Pres. 
*^?HEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
fJ 3603657 
A P P E N D I X 
{Ernst Jtafc 
TWSTRUST DEED is made this 20th dayof 
between McDONALD BROTHERS, INC. 
v/hose address is 
(City) 
August ,19 81 , 
,as Trustor, 
(State) 
BARRETT TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY, as TRUSTEE, and 
SECURITY FUNDUS CORPORATION & NEIL P. CHRISTENSON ** BENEflCIARY. 
Trustor hereby EfiSJ^SARft) WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, the following 
described property situated in S a l t Lake County, Utah: 
Commencing 1760 f e e t East from t h e West quar ter corner of S e c t i o n 16 , 
Township 3 South, Range 1 E a s t , S a l t Lake Base and Meridian; thence Soutn 
47* 06* East 6 3 4 . 3 f e e t ; thence South 80* 13* East 400 f e e t ; thence North 
500 f e e t more or l e s s to the c e n t e r of the South s e c t i o n , thence west 880 
f e e t t o the beg inn ing . 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and ail water rights, rights of way, easement*,, rents, 
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto now or hereafter used or 
enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date 
herewith, in the principal sum of $ 288,000 • 00 » payable to the order ot Beneficiary at the 
times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and payment of any sums expended or advanced by 
Beneficiary to protect the security hereof. 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the above property, to pay all charges and assessments on watei 
or water stock used on or with said property, not to commit waste, to maintain adequate hre insurance on improvements 
on said property, to pay all costs and expenses of collection (including Trustee's and attorney's fees in event ot default in 
?ayment of the indebtedness secured hereby and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services performed by rustee hereunder, including a reconveyance hereof.) 
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed 
to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
M n^nMAT.n aprvrmrpg TMP. 
STATE OF UTAH J 
COUNTY OF ) 
BY. ..til^^U/tiH, ..Li . H 
STEVENSON McDONALD, Pres~ - ^u5i ! i } , l # 
O^tt* §U -dayof [/4<tj*€*l , 19*? / , p e r s o r a i l y a p p e / r ^ w W w ^ \ ^ 
MCDONALD BROTHERS, INC. by STEVENSON McDONALD, P r e s . /s?th&*gnerf.,^jjJJ 
of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledges to me that ....he.... executed the same. 1 ^ • 5 ^ / C5 -^  1 
Notary Public f'* 
.ne.... executeu w 
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